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This paper investigates the employment effects of foreign acquisitions in acquired firms in 
Swedish manufacturing during the 1990s, a period characterized by a dramatic increase in 
foreign ownership. To handle likely endogeneity problems, we evaluate the effects of foreign 
acquisitions on the targeted firms’ employment by combining propensity score matching with 
difference-in-difference estimation. We find some evidence of positive employment effects in 
firms taken over by foreigners and it seems that the employment of skilled labor increases 
more than the employment of less-skilled labor. Moreover, we examine whether the 
employment impact of foreign ownership differs between takeovers of Swedish MNEs and 
non-MNEs. Our results indicate that the positive employment effects only appear in acquired 
non-MNEs. Furthermore, we observe shifts in skill intensities toward higher shares of skilled 
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During the 1990s, Sweden has witnessed a dramatic increase in foreign ownership mainly 
driven by foreign acquisitions of Swedish owned firms. This has entailed that at the beginning 
of the 2000s, the employment share in foreign owned firms in manufacturing was among the 
highest in OECD.
1 In the public Swedish debate, as well as in other countries with similar 
experiences, such a development has given rise to mixed feelings. Some fear that foreign 
acquisitions lead to job losses in acquired firms because foreign owners would be less 
committed to the host economy. Moreover, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are more 
footloose owing to their possibilities to relocate production and employment between their 
affiliates in different countries. Others maintain that foreign acquisitions strengthen the 
competitiveness of the acquired firms due to transfers of technology, knowledge and skills 
from the acquiring foreign MNE which, in turn, improve the performance in target firms 
which may involve higher employment. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this discussion by carrying out a systematic 
investigation of the effects of foreign acquisitions on employment in acquired firms. To this 
end, we use a panel of Swedish manufacturing firms between 1993 and 2002. A number of 
papers have examined the impact of domestic acquisitions on employment and the results are 
ambiguous.
2 Other, more recent studies for the UK have focused on employment effects of 
foreign acquisitions. Girma and Görg (2004) provide some evidence of reduced employment 
growth in domestic plants taken over by foreigners in the electronics sector but not in the food 
sector. Girma (2005) finds, on average, no impact of foreign acquisitions on employment in 
acquired domestic firms. Huttenen (2007) finds that foreign acquisition has a negative effect 
on the share of highly educated workers among the plant’s employees.
3 
 
                                                 
1 As compared to 21 other OECD countries in 2002, only Ireland, Luxembourg and Hungary had larger 
employment shares than Sweden in foreign owned firms in manufacturing. Moreover, in the service sector, 
where the prevalence of foreign ownership is generally lower than in manufacturing, the employment share in 
foreign owned firms is high in Sweden (Hansson et.al. 2007). 
2 See e.g. Brown and Medoff (1988), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) for the US 
and Conyon et. al. (2001) and (2002) for the UK. 
3 Brännlund et. al. (2004) is the only study of which we are aware that examines the effects of foreign ownership 
on employment using Swedish data. As a theoretical framework, they utilize a model where trade unions and 
employers bargain over wages and employment. Their empirical analysis is based on a panel of around 200 firms 
in Swedish manufacturing spanning over the period 1980-1994. They find no effect on employment of foreign 
ownership. As in Girma (2005) and Girma and Görg (2004), we evaluate the effects of foreign 
acquisitions on the targeted firms’ employment by combining propensity score matching with 
difference-in-difference estimation; a method suggested by e.g. Blundell and Costas Dias 
(2000).
4 The advantage of this approach is that we can deal with likely endogeneity problems. 
Domestic firms taken over by foreign firms are not randomly acquired, rather their 
characteristics differ systematically from those of non-acquired firms. Foreign investors may, 
for instance, cherry pick firms with good proprieties, such as firms with high productivity and 
high wages. Biased estimates on the employment effect will then arise if these characteristics 
also influence post-acquisition employment trajectories and are not controlled for. The 
difference-in-difference estimator, which compares the difference in employment before and 
after the acquisition of acquired firms with the difference in employment of non-acquired 
firms in the same period, allows for the existence of time-invariant factors that affect the 
selection. 
 
To preview our results, we find some evidence of positive employment effects in firms taken 
over by foreigners. If we, like Girma and Görg (2004), divide employment into skilled and 
less skilled labor, it appears that employment of skilled labor increases more than 
employment of less-skilled labor.
5 In Girma and Görg (2004), there is a reduction in 
employment of unskilled labor, whereas in plants acquired by foreign firms in the electronics 
industry, the employment of skilled labor is unaffected 
 
Finally, we postulate that the impact on employment of foreign ownership differs depending 
on whether a Swedish MNE or a non-MNE is taken over. We expect the scope for 
restructuring and changes in employment to be larger in acquired non-MNEs than in more 
productive Swedish MNEs acquired by foreign firms. Moreover, we anticipate larger 
potentials for technology transfer from foreign MNEs to acquired non-MNEs than to acquired 
MNEs. If technological changes are skilled-biased we expect to see more pronounced shifts in 
skill intensities towards higher shares of skilled labor in non-MNEs taken over by foreign 
MNEs.
6 The results from our empirical analysis are consistent with both these hypotheses. 
 
                                                 
4 Using similar methods, Karpaty (2007) finds a positive effect on productivity in Swedish firms acquired by 
foreign owners. 
5Our definition of skilled and less-skilled labor is based on educational attainment, whereas in Girma and Görg 
(2004) non-production workers are supposed to be skilled and production workers to be unskilled. 
6 The same hypothesis is put forward and tested using a different approach in Bandick and Hansson (2005). The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodological framework and the 
econometric specifications. Section 3 describes the data and the construction of the matched 
sample. Section 4 reports the empirical findings. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
2. The  methodological  framework 
 
Our empirical modeling problem is to evaluate whether there is a causal effect of foreign 
acquisition on employment y in a targeted domestic firm. We let  } { 1 , 0 ∈ it AF  be an indicator 
of whether firm i is acquired by a foreign firm in time period t and let 
1
s it y +  be employment at 
time  s t + ;  0 ≥ s , following acquisition. Firm i’s employment had not been acquired is 
denoted 
0
s it y + . We define the causal effect on employment of a foreign acquisition of firm i at 




s it s it y y + + −  (1) 
 
However, the problem is that 
0
s it y +  is obviously unobservable, instead we observe 
1
s it y + . This 
missing data problem is fundamental in evaluations of causal effects. Based on the 
microeconometric literature,
7 we define the average effect of acquisition of the acquired firms 
as: 
 
  { } { } { } 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 = − = = = − + + + + it s t it s t it s t s t AF y E AF y E AF y y E  (2) 
 
The challenge we face is to construct the counterfactual, the last term in equation (2), i.e. what 
would the employment in acquired firms have been, on average, had they not been acquired. 
One way of tackling this problem is to use the average employment of firms that still are 
domestically owned,  { } 0
0 = + it s it AF y E . Unfortunately, there are strong reasons to believe that 
it AF , if a firm i is acquired or not at time t, is endogenously determined, affected by 
contemporaneous effects. This must be taken into account, otherwise the estimate of the 
casual effect of foreign acquisition will be biased. 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Heckman et.al. (1997) and Deheija and Wahba (2002). Another approach is to employ matching techniques. With such techniques, we are able to 
construct a sample of non-acquired twin firms to acquired firms to approximate for the non-
observed counterfactual event in equation (2). Matching involves pairing acquired with non-
acquired firms with similar pre-acquisition characteristics X, e.g. productivity, wages, size, 
etc. The method we use is propensity score matching due to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
This technique has the advantage of summarizing all observables X into a single index 
variable. To implement propensity score matching, we begin by estimating the probability (or 
propensity score) of being acquired by a foreign firm using a probit model: 
 
  () ( ) t j it it D D X F AF p , , 1 1 − = =  (3) 
 
where 1 = it AF  if a domestically owned firm in year  1 − t  becomes foreign owned in year t. 
1 − it X  is a vector of relevant firm-specific characteristics in year  1 − t  which may affect the 
firm’s probability of being acquired in year t.  j D  and  t D  control for fixed industry and time 
effects. Once the propensity scores are calculated, we can (using the “caliper” matching 
method) select the nearest control firms in which the propensity score falls within a pre-
specified radius as a match for an acquired firm.
8 
 
When we have identified the control group of firms, we proceed and estimate the impact of 
foreign acquisitions on employment by using a difference-in-difference estimator. This 
estimator compares the difference in employment of the acquired (treated) firms A before 
1 − t  and after  s t +   0 ≥ s with our control group of non-acquired firms C. Formally, the 








s t s t y y y y 1 1 − + − + + − − − = γ  and we can obtain it by 
regressing data pooled across treated firms and firms in the control group
9 
 
  ε β β β β + × + + + = + + + − s t i s t i s t it After AF After AF y 3 2 1 0 , 1  (4) 
 
where  s t it y + − , 1  is our outcome variable.  i AF  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for 
acquired (treated) firms A and 0 for non-acquired firms C. It controls for constant differences 
                                                 
8 The procedure we utilize to match treated (acquired) firms with control (non-acquired) firms is the 
PSMATCH2 routine in Stata version 9 described in Leuven and Sianesi (2003). In our analysis, the pre-specified 
radius is set to 0.01. 
9 See Woolridge (2002). in employment between target firms and firms in the control group before the acquisition. We 
define the dummy variable  s t After +  as taking the value of 1 in post-acquisition years  s t +  and 
0 before acquisition  1 − t . This dummy variable captures aggregate period effects that are 
common between the two groups T and C. Finally, the term  s t i After AF + ×  is an interaction 
term between  i AF  and  s t After + . Its coefficient  3 β  represents the difference-in-difference 
(DiD) estimator of the effect of acquisition on the acquired (treated) firms A, i.e.  s t+ = γ β3 . 
An advantage of the DiD estimator is that it eliminates unobserved time-invariant differences 
in employment between acquired and non-acquired firms. Table 1 summarizes the 
interpretation of the coefficients in the regression in equation (4). Moreover, in our empirical 
analysis below, we also include a vector of firm characteristics to control for differences in 
observable attributes between firms. 
 
Table 1  Difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator 
 
 
3. Data  and  description 
 
3.1 The  data 
 
The data used in this paper covers the period 1993 to 2002 and includes all manufacturing 
firms with 20 employees or more. It has been collected by Statistics Sweden (SCB) and 
Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS). For each firm, we have information on 
sales, value added, employment, and capital stocks. Moreover, the employees can be divided 
into skilled and less-skilled labor and we define skilled labor as employees with some post-
secondary education. In addition, the firms can be separated into foreign-owned firms, 
Swedish owned MNEs and non-MNEs. In foreign-owned firms (foreign MNEs), foreigners 
possess more than 50 percent of the voting rights. A Swedish MNE is a domestically owned 
firm that is part of an enterprise with affiliates abroad.
10 Non-MNE firms are firms that are 
neither Swedish MNEs nor foreign MNEs. 
 
Table 2  Swedish MNEs, foreign MNEs and non-MNEs: Number of firms and   employment 
shares 1993-2002. 
                                                 
10 The first year in which we can distinguish Swedish MNEs from non-MNEs is 1993 and explains why our 
analysis begins in 1993. During the 1990s, Swedish manufacturing experienced a substantial increase in foreign 
ownership.  Table 2 shows how the numbers of firms and the employment shares have 
developed among Swedish MNEs, foreign MNEs and non-MNEs over the decade 1993-
2002.
11 The employment share of foreign MNEs has grown from 17 percent to 38 percent and 
their share of the firms from 2 percent to 11 percent. This trend appears to have evolved at the 
expense of Swedish MNEs because their employment share has fallen from 58 percent to 35 
percent and their share of firms has decreased from 26 percent to 19 percent. The importance 
of non-MNEs seems, on the other hand, to have remained more or less unchanged over the 
period studied. The employment share of non-MNEs fluctuates between 26 and 30 percent 
and their share of the firms between 70 and 75 percent. 
 
Table 3  Frequency of foreign acquisitions by year 1993-2002 
 
Table 3 reports, by year, the frequencies of foreign acquisitions in the manufacturing sector 
for firms with at least 20 employees. The number of foreign acquisitions varies considerably 
between years, from 37 in 1998 to 121 in 1996. On average, there are 64 foreign acquisitions 
per year and most of them, around 80 percent, consist of non-MNEs acquired by a foreign 
firm. 
 
Table 4  Foreign acquisitions by sectors 1994-2002 
 
In Table 4, we can see that more than 8 percent of all manufacturing firms have been acquired 
by foreign firms over the period studied. At the sector level, the table shows that foreign 
acquisition shares are especially high in chemicals, but also in the sectors of basic metals and 
paper and pulp products. A more systematic analysis on a more disaggregated industry level 
shows that the employment shares of foreign-owned firms are large in industries with high 
R&D intensity and a high degree of product differentiation, indicating that there are 
substantial economies of scale on the enterprise level in such industries. Moreover, the 
average size of plants and trade ratios tends to be low in industries with a large foreign 
presence, which suggests that economies of scale are small at the  plant level and that trade 
                                                 
11 Notice that the figures in Table 2 differ from Figure 1 in Bandick (2007). This since the latter is based on 
plant-level data and includes all manufacturing plants irrespective of size. Due to the cut-off limit at 20 
employees and the fact that non-MNE firms are smaller than MNE firms, the employment share of MNEs 
(foreign as well as Swedish) is larger here than in Bandick (2007). costs are high.
12 These results are consistent with implications from the theory of horizontal 
foreign direct investment. 
 
Table 5  Differences in means between foreign acquired firms and non-acquired firms in 
  pre- and post-acquisition years. All firms 
 
Firms taken over by foreigners differ from non-target firms in many respects. Table 5 points 
out differences in characteristics and performance between acquired and non-acquired firms 
before and after acquisition for all manufacturing firms with 20 employees or more. In the 
first column, which describes the situation one year before acquisition ( 1 − = T ), we can see 
that firms taken over by foreigners are larger. Both employment and shipment are 
significantly higher in acquired firms. Furthermore, they have higher capital-labor ratios and 
they are more skill intensive. To some extent this may explain the higher labor productivity in 
acquired firms and that these firms also pay higher wages. The results in the first column thus 
provide us with some evidence of “cherry picking”, i.e. that firms with good characteristics 
and performance are more likely to be targeted for acquisitions by foreigners. From the other 
columns in Table 5 that depict the pattern at the time of acquisition ( 0 = T ) and after 
acquisition ( 0 > T ), we infer that the differences between acquired and non-acquired firms 
appear to be persistent. The targeted firms continue to be larger, more capital and skill 
intensive, have higher productivity and pay higher wages than non-targeted firms. 
 
From the discussion in section 2, we know that differences in characteristics and performance 
between target and non-target firms before acquisition could bias estimates of the causal 
effect of foreign acquisition. The reason is that it is difficult to distinguish whether firms’ 
performance in post-acquisition years is attributable to the foreign takeover or to the fact that 
foreign firms tend to acquire firms with good characteristics and high performance. To 
overcome this problem, we apply a matching approach. 
 
3.2  The matched sample 
 
Our aim is to construct a sample of non-acquired (non-treated) firms − a comparison group − 
with similar pre-acquisition characteristics as the acquired (treated) firms. This group is 
supposed to constitute the counterfactual outcome: What would the outcome be in the 
                                                 
12 See chapter 4 in Hansson et.al. (2007). The results are similar to empirical findings for other developed 
countries (Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004). acquired firms had they never been acquired? To this end, we employ the propensity score 
matching method outlined in section 2. We estimate the propensity score, i.e. the conditional 
probability of being acquired by a foreign firm, by using the probit model in equation (3). 
 
To determine the firm specific characteristics that may affect a firm’s probability of being 
acquired, we notice that there is no consensus, neither in the theoretical nor in the empirical 
literature, about what causes a foreign acquisition.
13 Arguably, a key factor is differences in 
expected profits between the owner of the firm and the buyer. For instance, we would expect 
to observe acquisitions in cases where the buyer believes that the profits will rise in a 
potential target firm owing to the implementation of, e.g. better management, organization or 
technology, etc. Unfortunately, expected profits are not known to the econometrician. 
Therefore, in our probit model, we include observable characteristics such as the variables in 
Table 5. The variables used in the probit model are assumed to be important for the creation 
of a comparison group that comes from the same economic environment. 
 
To evaluate different specifications, we use the balancing condition which controls that each 
independent variable does not differ significantly between treated and non-treated firms. This 
means that only treated and non-treated firms with the same propensity score and the same 
distribution of their observable characteristics will be matched. The set of explanatory 
variables that fulfils the balancing condition criterion is: firm labor productivity, a firm’s 
employment relative to industry mean (two-digit) firm employment, age of firm and age 
squared, firm skill intensity, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a Swedish MNE 
firm or not, and the share of foreign employment at the industry level (two-digit) as a proxy of 
foreign presence in the industry.
14 All variables are lagged one year. Table 6 shows the results 
from estimating the probit model. 
 
Table 6  Probit model to estimate propensity score 
 
                                                 
13 Norbäck and Persson (2007a) and (2007b) set up a model for acquisition, greenfield and no entry and show 
that inward FDI affects the domestic economy through efficient ownership, competition effects and knowledge 
dispersion. In their model, they analyze different scenarios with a specific focus on welfare effects in the host 
country due to inward FDI either by acquisition or greenfield entry. 
14 Average wages, capital-labor ratios and sales are other firm-specific variables that may affect a firm’s 
probability of being acquired. The variables are not included in the probit model since the criteria for the 
balancing condition are not fulfilled. However, we control for these variables in the estimations of the 
difference-in-difference regression model in section 4. We find that skill intensive firms with high productivity are more likely to be acquired by 
foreign firms. Moreover, firms in industries with a large foreign presence are more often 
taken over. Finally, it appears that younger firms (non-linear relationship), relatively large 
firms, and firms of Swedish MNEs have higher probabilities of being targeted by foreign 
firms. However, for the latter variables, the coefficients are only significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
 
Table 7  Differences in means between foreign acquired firms and non-acquired firms in 
  pre- and post-acquisition years. Matched firms. 
 
Another condition that must be fulfilled in the matching procedure is the so-called common 
support condition. This criterion implies that at each point in time, a newly acquired (treated) 
firm is matched with non-target firms with propensity scores that are only slightly larger or 
less than those of the target firm. Some treated firms may be matched with more than one 
non-acquired firm, while acquired firms not matched with a non-treated firm are excluded. 
Furthermore, since our purpose is to study post-acquisition employment dynamics, we only 
include firms for which information is reported at least three years after acquisition in the 
analysis.
15 Eventually, we end up with a sample, henceforth denoted the matched sample, 
which consists of 181 treated and 372 non-treated firms. 
 
The aim of the matching procedure is thus to find a group of non-acquired firms that displays 
the same characteristics as the group of acquired firms. To see whether the treatment and the 
control group differ, in Table 7, we once more report differences in means with respect to 
size, productivity, factor intensities and wages, but this time for the acquired and non-
acquired firms that were successfully matched together. Regarding size, and to a large extent 
also labor productivity and factor intensities, the matching procedure has been successful in 
reducing the difference between acquired and non-acquired firms. However, there are still 
significant differences in wages. Compared to the unmatched sample in Table 4, the 
differences have also been substantially reduced in these variables. 
 
                                                 
15 Moreover, firms that switch back and forth between different ownership status and greenfield operations are 
excluded. 4.  Difference-in-difference matching results 
 
To examine whether foreign acquisitions of Swedish owned firms have had any effects on 
employment in post-acquisition years, we estimate the regression model in equation (4). Our 
dependent variable is employment at the firm level in logs and the key estimate is the 
difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator 3 β . Table 8 reports the effects of foreign takeovers 
on post-acquisition total employment. The sample consists of matched firms remaining in the 
panel at least five consecutive years. 
 
Table 8  Effects of foreign acquisitions on post-acquisition total employment 
 
Column (i) presents the results from OLS estimations of the basic model in equation (4). The 
DiD estimator is positive, which suggests that, on average, foreign acquisitions have had a 
positive effect on total employment in the years following takeovers. However, the coefficient 
is only significant at the 10 percent level and in column (ii), where we add firm-level controls, 
the acquisition effect on employment disappears. 
 
To investigate the dynamic pattern of the post-acquisition employment effect, in column (iii), 
we replace the interaction variable for the whole post-acquisition period  s t i After AF + ×  with 
year-by-year interaction variables. None of the coefficients on these year-by-year interactions 
variables are significant. 
 
The positive and significant estimate on the dummy variable,  i AF , indicates that there is a 
difference between acquired and non-acquired firms before acquisition. Employment appears 
to be larger in target firms before takeover.
16 However, this difference is heavily reduced as 
compared to the results from the sample consisting of all firms remaining at least five years in 
the panel, as shown in Table A1.   
 
Even though the differences in pre-acquisition characteristics between treated and non-treated 
firms in the matched sample were substantially reduced, according to Table 7 there still seem 
to be significant differences in some characteristics that may affect the results. One way of 
taking remaining differences into account is to estimate a firm-fixed effect (FE) model. In 
                                                 
16 Note that in our matching procedure we do not use employment but relative employment. such a model, time invariant permanent firm-specific effects are absorbed by the fixed effect 
transformation. The DiD estimator in the fixed effect model in column (iv) suggests that 
foreign acquisitions have had a positive impact on employment in target firms. Total 
employment has, on average, increased by about 4 percent in acquired firms relative to non-
acquired firms after takeover. 
 
In Tables 9 and 10, we present results showing whether the employment effects of foreign 
acquisitions differ between skilled and less-skilled labor. We estimate the same type of 
specifications as in Table 8 and the result for skilled labor is reported in Table 9 and that for 
less-skilled labor in Table 10. 
 
Table 9  Effects of foreign acquisitions on post-acquisition skilled labor employment 
 
Table 10  Effects of foreign acquisitions on post-acquisition less-skilled labor employment 
 
We notice that a similar pattern stands out in Table 9 and Table 10. Yet the positive 
employment effect for skilled labor is more pronounced. Comparing the results in the fixed 
effect model in specifications (iv), we find that after acquisition, skilled labor employment, on 
average, grew by 8 percent, whereas less-skilled labor employment, on average,  increased by 
almost 4 percent in target firms relative to non-target firms. 
 
In the 1990s, many important manufacturing Swedish MNEs have been targets in foreign 
acquisitions.
17 In Table 2, we observed that the employment share of foreign MNEs in 
Swedish manufacturing increased at the expense of Swedish MNEs. Yet, we also noticed in 
Table 3 that, on average, only 20 percent of the firms acquired by foreigners were Swedish 
MNEs. We presume that the impact on employment after takeover may differ due to whether 
the acquired firm is a Swedish MNE or a non-MNE. The reason is that the scope for 
restructuring and changes in employment is probably less in firms already operating in 
multinational networks. Such firms are forced to be more efficient and we know that MNEs 
tend to have higher productivity than non-MNEs. The possibilities of development after 
foreign acquisitions are better in non-MNEs. Accordingly, we expect larger employment 
changes in non-MNEs than in Swedish MNEs after foreign takeovers. Moreover, technology 
                                                 
17 Firms such as Astra, Pharmacia, Volvo Car and Saab Automobile are some well-known former Swedish 
MNEs that shifted ownership in the 1990s and nowadays are foreign owned. transfers are more likely to take place when foreign-owned firms acquire non-MNEs, since 
the technology levels are high in Swedish MNEs even before takeover. If technological 
changes owing to technology transfers to acquired firms are skilled-biased, we also expect to 
see the shares of skilled labor grow faster in non-MNEs taken over by foreigners than in 
targeted Swedish MNEs. 
 
To investigate these hypotheses, we interact our key variable  s t i After AF + ×  (and the 
treatment dummy  i AF ) with dummies showing the status of the acquired firm − Swedish 
MNE or non-MNE − before takeover; if  1 = i MNE  firm i was a Swedish MNE and if 
1 = i NMNE , it was a non-MNE. Table 11 shows the results. 
 
Table 11  Effects of foreign acquisitions on post-acquisition employment in targeted 
  MNEs and non-MNEs 
 
The DiD estimators indicate that there are positive effects on employment after acquisition in 
non-MNEs, whereas there seems to be no impact of foreign acquisitions on employment in 
Swedish MNEs. From our fixed effect model, in specification (ii), we infer that, on average, 
employment in acquired non-MNEs is 6.5 percent higher after a takeover relative to non-
acquired firms. If we divide employment into skilled and less-skilled employment, our 
estimates suggest that after acquisition, employment of skilled labor has grown faster than 
employment of less-skilled labor in targeted non-MNEs. This indicates that foreign 
acquisitions have led to increased skill intensities in acquired non-MNEs, relative to non-
targeted firms. In acquired Swedish MNEs, foreign takeovers appear to have no effect, neither 











                                                 
18 The results conform to the outcome in Bandick and Hansson (2005). 5.  Concluding remarks 
 
In the 1990s, the employment share in foreign owned firms in Swedish manufacturing has 
grown spectacularly. To examine the employment effects in firms that have become foreign 
owned in the 1990s, we utilize a propensity score matching technique with difference-in-
difference estimation. We allowed these effects to be different for less-skilled and skilled 
employees. Moreover, we argue that the effect may be smaller in firms already engaged in 
international networks. Therefore, we also allowed for differential impact on employment due 
to acquisitions of Swedish MNEs and acquisitions of non-MNEs.  
 
Our analysis gives no support to the worries that foreign acquisitions may lead to job losses in 
acquired firms. If anything, there are some indications of positive employment growth in 
acquired non-MNEs, especially of skilled labor, which may be due to technology transfers 
from the acquiring foreign MNEs that lead to skilled-biased technical change in acquired non-
MNEs. In Swedish MNEs taken over by foreigners, on the other hand, there appear to be no 
employment effects at all. References 
 
[1]   Bandick, R. and Hansson, P. (2005), Inward FDI and demand for skills in Sweden. ESI 
  working paper 2005:10. 
 
[2]    Bandick, R. (2007), Multinationals and plant survival in Swedish manufacturing. 
University of Nottingham Research Paper No. 2007/31. 
 
[3]   Brännlund, R, Nordström, J. and Svedin, D. (2004), Foreign ownership and effects on 
  employment and wages: The case of Sweden. Umeå Economic Studies 638. 
 
[4]   Barba Navaretti, G. and Venables, A. (2004), Multinational firms in the world economy. 
  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
[5]   Blundell, R. and Costas Dias, M. (2000), Evaluation methods for non-experimental data. 
  Fiscal Studies, 21, 427-468. 
 
[6]   Brown, G. and Medoff, J. (1988), The impact of firm acquisition on labor. In Auerbach, 
A:J. (ed.), Corporate takeovers: Causes and consequensces. Chicago: Chicago 
university press. 
 
[7]   Conyon, M, Girma, S, Thompson, S. and Wright, P. (2001), Do hostile mergers destroy 
jobs? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45, 427-440. 
 
[8]   Conyon, M, Girma, S, Thompson, S. and Wright, P. (2002), The impact of mergers and 
  acquisitions on company employment. European Economic Review, 46, 31-49. 
 
[9]    Dehejia, R. and Wahba, S. (2002), Propensity score matching methods for non-
experimental causal studies. Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 151-161. 
 
[10]   Girma, S. and Görg, H. (2004), Blessing or Curse? Domestic plants survival and 
employment prospects after foreign acquisition, Applied Economic Quarterly, 50, 89-
110. 
 
[11]  Girma, S. (2005), Safeguarding jobs? Acquisition FDI and employment dynamics in 
U.K. manufacturing, Review of World Economics, 141, 165-178. 
 
[12]  Hansson; P, Karpaty, P, Lindvert, M, Lundberg, L, Poldahl, A. and Yun, L. (2007), 
Svenskt näringsliv i en globaliserad värld (Swedish business sector in a globalised 
world). ITPS A2007:4. 
 
[13]  Heckman, J, Ichimura, H, Smith, J. and Todd, P. (1997), Matching as an econometric 
  evaluation estimator: Evidence from evaluating a job training programme, Review of 
 Economic  Studies, 64, 605-654. 
 
[14]  Huttunen K. (2007), The Effect of Foreign Acquisition on Employment and Wages: 
Evidence from Finnish Establishments, The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT 
Press, vol. 89(3), pages 497-509, 05. 
 
[15]  Karpaty, P. (2007) Productivity Effects of Foreign Acquisitions in Swedish 
Manufacturing: The FDI Productivity Issue Revisited. International Journal of the 
Economics of Business, vol 14(2). pages 241-260 [16]    Leuven, E. and Sianesi, B. (2003), PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full 
Mahalanobis and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and coivariate 
imbalance testing. Available at http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html. 
 
[17]   Lichtenberg, F.R. and Siegel, D. (1990), The effect of ownership changes on the 
employment and wages of central office and other personnel, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 33, 383-408. 
 
[18]  McGuckin, R.H. and Nguyen, S.V. (2001), The impact of ownership changes: A view 
from labour markets, International Journal Industrial Organization, 19, 739-762. 
 
[19]  Norbäck, P.J. and Persson, L. (2007a), Globalization and profitability of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions, Economic Theory, forthcoming. 
 
[20]  Norbäck, P.J. and Persson, L. (2007b), Investment liberalization – Why a restrictive 
crossborder merger policy can be counterproductive, Journal of International 
Economics, forthcoming 
 
[21]  Rosenbaum, P. and Rubin, D.B. (1983), The central role of the propensity score in 
  observational studies for causal effects, Biometrika, 70, 41-55. 
 
[22]    Woolridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric analysis of cross-section and panel data. 
Cambridge: MIT-press. 
 Table 1  Difference-in-difference estimator. 
  Before acquisition    After acquisition    Difference  
 Acquired (treated) firms    1 0 β β +   3 2 1 0 β β β β + + +    3 2 β β +  
Non-acquired (control) firms    0 β    2 0 β β +    2 β  
 Difference    1 β    3 1 β β +    3 β  
 
 
Table 2  Foreign MNEs, Swedish MNEs and non-MNEs: Number of firms and 
  employment shares 1993-2002. 
    Foreign MNEs    Swedish MNEs    Non-MNEs 
Year  Firms  Employment   Firms  Employment  Firms  Employment 
   (Percent)    Percent    (Percent)    Percent    (Percent)    Percent 
1993    50  (2.1)  16.7  603  (25.7)  57.6  1693  (72.2)  25.7 
1994    86  (3.5)  17.4  619  (24.9)  56.8  1777  (71.6)  25.8 
1995    115  (4.3)  20.0  601  (22.6)  50.1  1949  (73.1)  29.9 
1996    166  (5.7)  22.7  553  (19.1)  48.6  2175  (75.2)  28.7 
1997    183  (6.1)  23.2  550  (18.5)  49.6  2245  (75.4)  27.2 
1998    204  (6.5)  24.7  552  (17.6)  48.0  2378  (75.9)  27.3 
1999    223  (7.2)  29.1  585  (19.0)  42.2  2269  (73.7)  28.7 
2000    253  (8.0)  32.7  603  (19.1)  40.2  2296  (72.8)  27.1 
2001    326  (10.2)  37.3  588  (18.4)  34.4  2276  (71.3)  28.3 
2002   340  (10.9)  38.0  604  (19.4)  35.3  2162  (69.6)  26.7 
 
 
Table 3  Frequency of foreign acquisitions by year 1993-2002. 
   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000   2001   2002  94-02 
  Non-MNEs  to     40    35   79   34   29   45   49   95   58    51.6 
  foreign  MNEs  (95.2) (81.4) (65.3) (79.1) (78.4) (71.4) (87.5) (94.1) (81.7) (80.4) 
 Swedish  MNEs  to   2   8    42   9   8    18   7   6   13    12.6 
  foreign  MNEs    (4.8)  (18.6) (34.7) (20.9) (21.6) (28.6) (12.5)   (5.9)  (18.3) (19.6) 
  Total   42   43    121   43   37    63    56    101   71    64.2 
 
Notes: Percent of total number of foreign acquisitions within parenthesis. 
 
Table 4  Foreign acquisitions by sectors 1994-2002. 
  Industry  Target firms    Number of   Acquisition share 
     firms*    Percent 
Food, beverages and tobacco    28    440    6.4 
Textiles, apparel and leather    10    182    5.5 
Wood products    33    576    5.7 
Paper and pulp products    20    122    16.4 
Printing  and  publishing    35   617   5.7 
Chemicals    44   138   31.9 
Rubber  and  plastics    25   266   9.4 
Non-metallic  products    23   161   14.3 
Basic  metals    19   111   17.1 
Non-electrical  machinery    55   1,043   5.3 
Electrical machinery    75    816    9.2 
Telecommunication   18    209    8.6 
Professional  goods    9   141   6.4 
Motor  vehicles    24   172   14.0 
Transport equipment     25    204    12.3 
and other manufacturing    21    426    4.9 
  Total   464   5,624    8.3 
 
Notes: *Unique number of firms during the period in each sector. 
 
 Table 5  Differences in means between foreign acquired firms and  
  non-acquired firms in pre- and post-acquisition years. All firms. 
 Unmatched  firms 
  Target vs. non-target firms 
 Variable    1 − = T     0 = T     1 = T    2 = T     3 = T  
  Difference Difference Difference Difference Difference 
   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio) 
       
  Employment   277   286   323   329   333 
   (6.65)
***   (6.66)
***   (6.75)
***   (6.85)
***   (7.01)
*** 
       
  Shipment   626   727   784   647   233 
   (7.12)
***   (6.78)
***   (6.09)
***   (5.01)
***   (2.28)
** 
       
  Labor  productivity   85   44   65   84   84 
   (2.20)
***   (0.70)    (3.41)
***   (2.19)
**   (3.64)
*** 
       
  Capital-labor  ratio   150    138    146    164   165 
   (2.41)
***   (2.46)
***   (2.48)
***   (2.49)
***   (2.46)
*** 
       
  Skill  intensity   5.4   5.5   5.4   5.0   5.1 
   (5.13)
***   (5.60)
***   (5.73)
***   (5.23)
***   (5.26)
*** 
       
  Average  wage   26   26   27   25   23 
   (7.48)
***   (7.45)
***   (8.95)
***   (7.94)
***   (6.93)
*** 
       
 Wages:  skilled   71   68    64   61   55 
   (9.72)
***   (9.51)
***   (9.52)
***   (9.01)
***   (7.48)
*** 
       
  Wages:  less-skilled    19   19   19   18    17 
   (7.10)
***   (7.06)
***   (7.78)
***   (7.46)
***   (6.41)
*** 
       
  O b s e r v a t i o n s        
  Target  firms   192   192   192   192   192 
  Non-target  firms    3,659   3,659   3,659   3,659    3,659 
 
Notes: Shipment is in million SEK. Wages, capital-labor ratios and labor productivity, value added per 
employee, are in thousand SEK. Skill intensity, share of employees with a post-secondary education, is in 
percentages.  1 − = T  means one year before acquisition and  3 = T , accordingly, three years after acquisition. Table 6  Probit model to estimate propensity score. 
 Probability  of 
Variables foreign  acquisition 
  
  

































LR chi2(13)  105.18 
Observations 14,148 
 
Notes: The dependent variable  1 = it AF  if a domestically owned firm in year  1 − t  becomes foreign owned in 
year t. z-statistics is within parenthesis. The explanatory variables are, with the exception of foreign presence, 
firm specific characteristics in year  1 − t . Relative employment is firm employment relative to mean firm 
employment at the industry level. Labor productivity is value added per employee and skill intensity is the share 
of employees with post-secondary education at the firm level. Age is age of the firm and Swedish MNE is a 
dummy variable indicating whether the firm is a Swedish MNE firm or not, and the share of foreign employment 
at industry the level (two-digit) is a proxy of foreign presence in the industry. Table 7  Differences in means between foreign acquired firms and non-acquired firms in 
  pre- and post-acquisition years. Matched firms. 
 Matched  firms 
  Treated vs. control firms 
 Variable    1 − = T     0 = T     1 = T    2 = T     3 = T  
  Difference Difference Difference Difference Difference 
   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio) 
       
  Employment   99   88   126    139    156 
   (0.98)   (0.84)   (1.04)    (1.15)   (1.32) 
       
  Shipment   380   424   462   280    -166 
   (1.46)   (1.39)   (1.29)   (0.92)   (0.73) 
       
  Labor  productivity   49    23   26    46   48 
   (1.98)
**   (1.11)    (1.22)    (1.97)
**   (1.89)
* 
       
  Capital-labor  ratio    -21    75    81   113   109 
   (0.09)    (1.15)
.   (1.13)    (1.86)
*   (1.69)
* 
       
 Skill  intensity   1.9   2.0   1.7   1.2   1.4 
   (1.56)    (1.69)
*   (1.43)   (1.06)   (1.22) 
       
  Average  wage    19   19   21   16   13 
   (7.37)
***   (5.82)
***   (7.60)
***   (5.20)
***   (3.29)
*** 
       
  Wages:  skilled   39   35   34   28   19 
   (6.76)
***   (6.26)
***   (6.09)
***   (4.65)
***   (2.13)
** 
       
  Wages:  less-skilled    15   16   18   14    10 
   (6.24)
***   (5.03)
***   (7.64)
***   (4.82)
***   (3.23)
*** 
       
  O b s e r v a t i o n s        
  Target  firms   181   181   181   181   181 
  Non-target  firms    372   372   372   372    372 
 
Notes: See notes Table 5. Table 8  Effects of foreign acquisitions on post-acquisition total  
employment 
   (i)    (ii)    (iii)    (iv)    (v) 
Variables  DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD FE  DiD FE 
   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio) 
       
  s t i After AF + ×    0.077   0.041     0.037     
   [1.73]
*   [0.95]     [2.14]
**    
       
  1 + × t i After AF       0.033     0.011 
      [0.70]     [0.38] 
       
  2 + × t i After AF       -0.019     0.022 
      [0.35]     [0.80] 
       
  3 + × t i After AF       0.042     0.042 
  
.   [0.80]     [1.47] 
       
  4 + × t i After AF       0.045     0.055 
      [0.73]     [1.84]
* 
       
  5 + × t i After AF       0.112     0.048 
      [1.56]     [1.48] 
       
  i AF    0.350   0.339   0.340     
   [3.13]
***   [3.24]
***   [3.22]
***    
       
  s t After +     0.001   -0.008     -0.014   
   [0.03]    [-0.23]      [-1.03]   
       
  Firm  controls   no   yes   yes   yes   yes 
       
 Year  dummies   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes 
       
  Industry  dummies   yes   yes   yes   no   no 
       
  2 R    0.37   0.46    0.46     
  2 R  within       0.057    0.059 
  2 R  between       0.131    0.119 
2 R  overall       0.061    0.055 
Observations    3,643   3,643   3,643   3,643    3,643 
 
Notes: As firm controls we use average wage, sales and capital-labor ratio. Square brackets [ ] give White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t statistics. 
 Table 9  Effects of foreign acquisition on post-acquisition skilled labor  
Employment. 
   (i)    (ii)    (iii)    (iv)    (v) 
Variables  DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD FE  DiD FE 
   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio) 
       
  s t i After AF + ×    0.104   0.095     0.080     
   [2.00]
**   [1.85]
*     [3.56]
***    
       
  1 + × t i After AF       0.112     0.078 
      [ 1 . 9 6 ]
**     [2.15]
** 
       
  2 + × t i After AF       0.056     0.068 
      [0.88]     [1.85]
* 
       
  3 + × t i After AF       0.060     0.066 
  
.   [0.93]     [1.77]
* 
       
  4 + × t i After AF       0.086     0.090 
      [1.14]     [2.31]
** 
       
  5 + × t i After AF       0.167     0.122 
      [ 1 . 9 7 ]
**     [2.84]
*** 
       
  i AF    0.358   0.298   0.299     
   [2.79]
***   [2.48]
**   [2.45]
***    
       
  s t After +     0.009   -0.033     -0.013   
   [0.21]    [-0.79]      [-0.73]   
       
  Firm  controls   No   yes   yes   yes   yes 
       
 Year  dummies   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes 
       
  Industry  dummies   yes   yes   yes   no   no 
       
  2 R    0.43   0.53    0.53     
  2 R  within       0.157    0.141 
  2 R  between       0.004    0.120 
2 R  overall       0.015    0.056 
Observations    3,643   3,643   3,643   3,643    3,643 
 
Notes: See notes Table 8. 
 Table 10  Effects of foreign acquisition on post-acquisition less-skilled  
labor employment. 
   (i)    (ii)    (iii)    (iv)    (v) 
Variables  DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD FE  DiD FE 
   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio) 
       
  s t i After AF + ×    0.090   0.046     0.037     
   [1.96]
**   [1.05]      [2.07]
***    
       
  1 + × t i After AF       0.031     0.005 
      [0.67]     [0.17] 
       
  2 + × t i After AF       -0.016     0.023 
      [0.30]     [0.77] 
       
  3 + × t i After AF       0.058     0.047 
  
.   [1.05]     [1.58] 
       
  4 + × t i After AF       0.058     0.062 
      [0.93]     [2.00]
** 
       
  5 + × t i After AF       0.120     0.048 
      [1.63]     [1.39] 
       
  i AF    0.346   0.346   0.347     
   [3.27]
***   [3.27]
**   [3.25]
***    
       
  s t After +     -0.008   -0.008     -0.016   
   [-0.21]    [-0.22]      [-1.09]   
       
  Firm  controls   no   yes   yes   yes   yes 
       
 Year  dummies   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes 
       
  Industry  dummies   yes   yes   yes   no   no 
       
  2 R    0.35   0.44    0.44     
  2 R  within       0.040    0.042 
  2 R  between       0.061    0.051 
2 R  overall       0.034    0.030 
Observations    3,643   3,643   3,643   3,643    3,643 
 
Notes: See notes Table 8. 
 Table 11  Effects of foreign acquisition on post-acquisition employment in targeted MNEs 
 and  non-MNEs. 
    Total employment    Skilled labor    Less-skilled labor 
   (i)    (ii)    (iii)    (iv)    (v)    (vi) 
Variables    DiD OLS  DiD FE  DiD OLS  DiD FE  DiD OLS  DiD FE 
   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio) 
         
  s t i i After AF MNE + × ×    -0.057   -0.021   -0.047   0.015   -0.033   -0.011 
   [-0.87]   [-0.85]   [-0.63]   [0.45]   [-0.48]   [-0.44] 
         
  s t i i After AF NMNE + × ×    0.121   0.065   0.170   0.104   0.120   0.064 
   [2.41]
**   [3.23]
***   [2.83]
***   [3.95]
***   [2.31]
***   [3.04]
*** 
         
  i i AF MNE ×     0.500     0.617     0.457   
   [2.59]
***     [2.85]
***     [2.34]
***  
         
  i i AF NMNE ×     0.044     -0.052     0.070   
    [0.39]     [-0.41]     [0.61]   
         
  s t After +    -0.021   -0.012   -0.033   -0.008   -0.022   -0.014 
   [-0.62]   [-0.90]   [-0.82]   [-0.47]   [-0.62]   [-1.03] 
         
  Firm  controls   yes   Yes   yes   yes   yes   yes 
         
 Year  dummies   yes   Yes   yes   yes   yes   yes 
         
  Industry  dummies   yes   No   yes   no   yes   no 
         
  2 R     0.45     0.53     0.43   
  2 R  within      0.060     0.141     0.042 
  2 R  between      0.076     0.087     0.033 
2 R  overall      0.044     0.048     0.023 
Observations   3,643   3,643    3,643    3,643   3,643   3,643 
 





Table A1  Effects of foreign acquisitions on post-acquisition employment,  
unmatched sample. 
Total employment  Skilled employment  Less-skilled 
employment 
 (i)    (ii)    (iii)    (iv)    (v)  (vi) 
DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD OLS  DiD OLS 
 
Variables 
 (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio)   (t-ratio) 
        
  s t i After AF + ×    0.196   0.152   0.202   0.156   0.211   0.166 
   [4.91]
***   [3.84]
***   [4.82]
***   [3.61]
***   [4.81]
***   [3.94]
*** 
        
  i AF    0.851   0.702   1.032   0.801   0.815   0.692 
   [9.22]
***   [8.84]
***   [9.67]
***   [8.72]
***   [8.67]
***   [8.56]
*** 
        
  s t After +     -0.079   -0.076   -0.123   -0.120   -0.086   -0.083 







        
 Firm  controls   no   yes   no   Yes   no   yes 
        
 Year  dummies   yes   yes   yes   Yes   yes   yes 
        
  Industry  dummies   yes   yes   yes   Yes   yes   yes 
        
  2 R   0.20   0.30    0.30   0.40  0.17  0.28 
Observations 30,053    30,053  30,053   30,053   30,053    30,053 
 
Notes: As firm controls we use average wage, sales and capital-labor ratio. Square brackets  
[ ] give White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent t statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 